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INTRODUCTION-SAFE HARBORS AND STERN WARNINGS:
FCC REGULATION OF INDECENT BROADCASTING
RicHARD C. TURKINGTON*
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Govern-
ment is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of
others whose views should be expressed on this unique
medium .... It is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, that is paramount.'
For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated
here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its
genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity
is another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because
government officials cannot make principled distinctions
in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste
and style so largely to the individual.2
This symposium is quite timely. FCC broadcast indecency pol-
icy is in chaos. The indecency policy of the agency has changed
four times in the last twenty years.3
In 1978, the Supreme Court upheld application of FCC inde-
cency policy to an afternoon radio broadcast of George Carlin's
Filthy Words dialogue in Pacifica v. FCC.4 Following Pacifica, the
Commission formally adopted a policy that prohibited indecent
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. 1963, J.D. 1966,
Wayne State University; LL.M. 1967, New York University. Professor Turkington
would like to acknowledge the contributions of his Research Assistants, Andrew
Monkmeyer and Christine Guiliano.
1. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
2. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
3. For a history of FCC indecency policy, see Edythe Wise, A Historical Perspec-
tive on the Protection of Children From Broadcast Indecency, 3 VmiL. SPORTS & ENr. L.J. 15
(1996).
4. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
1
Turkington: Introduction - Safe Harbors and Stern Warnings: FCC Regulation of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
2 VILLANOvA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
material if aired before ten o'clock p.m. The period from ten
o'clock p.m. to six o'clock a.m. was considered a safe harbor for
broadcast indecency. This safe harbor was changed to midnight to
six o'clock a.m. and was then found unconstitutional by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Con-
gress then mandated that the FCC reject the concept of safe harbor
for indecent speech and extend the prohibition to the whole broad-
casting day. The twenty-four hour prohibition was also found un-
constitutional by the D.C. Circuit. Congress then mandated that the
FCC institute a safe harbor policy from ten o'clock p.m. to six
o'clock a.m. for public broadcasting stations that go off the air at or
before midnight, and a midnight to six o'clock a.m. policy for all
other radio and television broadcast stations. On June 30, 1995,
seven members of the D.C. Circuit found the midnight portion of
the policy unconstitutional and directed the FCC to revise its safe
harbor policy from ten o'clock p.m. to six o'clock a.m.5 The FCC
could constitutionally extend the ban until midnight if the ban was
applicable to all broadcasters. Four members of the Court that
heard the case en banc dissented and would have declared the total
ban on indecent material from six o'clock a.m. to ten o'clock p.m.
or midnight unconstitutional. 6
The current controversy over governmental regulation of inde-
cent speech that is broadcast over radio or television is centered
around the question of whether broadcast speech is provided the
same protection under the First Amendment as speech expressed
in the non-broadcast media. Most indecent and offensive speech is
fully protected by the First Amendment and may not be restricted
by the government in the absence of compellingjustification. 7 This
5. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 656-59 (D.C. Cir.
1995) [hereinafter ACT IV] (citing Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852
F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter ACT I]; Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter ACT II]; Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter ACT III]), vacated in
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. (1994)).
6. ACT IV 58 F.3d at 683 (Edwards, CJ., dissenting).
7. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that prosecution of
Cohen under an "offensive conduct" statute for wearing a jacket in a courthouse
that bore the words, "Fuck The Draft" violated Cohen's right to freedom of
speech). In Cohen, the Court rejected California's claims that the prosecution was
a justifiable restriction of Cohen's speech as fighting words, as a clear and present
danger to the draft, as a breach of the peace, as obscenity, or as necessary to pro-
tect significant privacy interests. See also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973)
(holding that disorderly conduct prosecution of Hess for using words "we'll take
the fucking street later" violated the First Amendment because speech did not
direct that anyone take immediate action and did not constitute a clear and pres-
ent danger to public disorder).
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is because standard First Amendment theory is based on the view
that the value and worth of speech is determined by subjecting the
speech to the free marketplace of ideas.8
Several important principles have been generated from the
free market place theory. One principle is that editors, not the gov-
ernment, should decide what to publish.9 Another principle is the
harm principle, namely, that speech may not be punished on the
basis of its content unless the restriction of speech is necessary to
prevent harm to individuals or institutions.10 In applying the harm
principle, the Court has not considered the psychological or emo-
tional injury that occurs from offensive speech as harm. This sepa-
ration of harmful and offensive speech has spawned a subsidiary
principle that provides that speech may not be punished solely on
the basis that it is offensive to individuals or groups in society.11
8. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that "ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas -
that the best test of truth is power of thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of market"); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis and
Holmes, JJ., concurring ) (commenting that through discussion and processes of
education, falsehoods and fallacies will be exposed and the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence).
9. See Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that right of
reply statute requiring print media to publish paid political advertisement violated
freedom of press). The Court stated: "Compelling editors or publishers to publish
that which reason tells them should be published is what is at issue in this case."
Id. at 256.
10. The harm principle is embodied in several standard First Amendment
tests that are applied to laws regulating the content of expression. In cases where
speech that advocates violence is punished the Court has required that the speech
reach the brink of the harm that is advocated before it may be suppressed. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969);Justice Holmes' and Justice Brandeis'
exposition of the Clear and Present Danger Test in Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377, and
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. In other contexts where the content of speech has been
regulated, the Court has read the First Amendment to require that the govern-
ment demonstrate that the law be carefully tailored to serve substantial govern-
mental interests other than protecting persons or groups against offense. See
Police Dep't. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 923 (1972) (invalidating
restriction on picketing within 150 feet of a primary or secondary school that ex-
empted labor unions); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of The New York State
Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (holding that New York's Son of Sam
law violated guarantees of freedom of press because law was content based and
state had not shown that law was narrowly drawn to serve compelling state interests
- insuring that victims of crime be compensated, ensuring criminals do not profit
from their crimes and preventing wrongdoers from dissipating assets).
11. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the first amendment, it is that the government may not pro-
hibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable."). See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210
(1975) ("IT] he Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of
otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the
unwilling listener or viewer.").
1996]
3
Turkington: Introduction - Safe Harbors and Stern Warnings: FCC Regulation of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
4 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Attempts to restrict racist, hate or vulgar speech have been found to
violate the First Amendment when they are based upon laws that
are designed to prevent offense. 12
Within this traditional regime, an exception to the harm prin-
ciple was created for obscenity. Three decades ago, the Court re-
jected the harm principle and chose a definitional scheme for
determining the boundaries of constitutional authority to regulate
sexually erotic expression. Speech that was adjudicated as obscene,
as defined by the Court, was not speech entitled to First Amend-
ment protection.13 Obscenity has always been tied to the sexual
content of the speech. Initially, obscenity was defined as prurient
and highly offensive speech. 14 Later, the Court refined the defini-
tion to depictions of explicit sexual acts that were prurient in ap-
peal and highly offensive. The obscenity exception is a limited one.
Only speech that is adjudicated to come within the judicial defini-
tion of obscenity is exempt from First Amendment protection. 15
Sexually erotic expression that falls short of obscenity, pornogra-
phy, or other forms of indecent, violent, offensive or dehumanizing
speech enjoys full blown First Amendment protection.16 The Court
has recognized the governmental authority to define obscenity
somewhat differently when erotic expression is directed at minors
and found that the First Amendment did not protect the right of
12. See RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding ordinance
prohibiting burning of cross by someone who knows it will raise anger on basis of
race unconstitutional because it reaches protected speech).
13. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In Roth, the Court rejected
the claim that regulation of sexually erotic speech should be evaluated under the
clear and present danger test, noting that "implicit in the history of the first
amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance." Id. at 484. Roth adopts the premise that obscenity is valueless speech that is
not protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 484-85.
14. The Roth test for obscenity was: whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest. Id, at 489.
15. In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Court revised the Roth test
and adopted the current test for obscenity: (a) whether the average person apply-
ing contemporary community standards would find that the work taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical, or scientific value. Id. at 24. The examples specifically defined sexual con-
duct provided by the Court for part (b) of the test were: (1) patently offensive
representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, actual or simulated; (2)
patently offensive representation or descriptions of masturbation, excretory func-
tions and lewd exhibitions of the genitals. Id. at 25.
16. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (hold-
ing Federal Statute banning dial-a-porn sex messages that were indecent but not
obscene unconstitutional).
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persons to sell or distribute obscenity that was harmful to minors.
However, child obscenity protection laws must be narrowly drawn
and do not provide a constitutional basis for enacting laws that pre-
vent adults from access to First Amendment protected speech.1 7
Historically, the FCC has restricted broadcast licensees from
airing offensive indecent speech that falls short of obscenity.18 The
Commission has defined indecent material, since 1987 as, "language
or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs."' 9
Current federal policy on regulation of non-obscene programming
that contains indecent speech has not fared well recently against
First Amendment challenges in federal courts. Several commenta-
tors in this symposium discuss the constitutionality issues raised by
FCC indecency policy. Edythe Wise's and Jeremy Lipschultz's arti-
cles trace the policies and practices of the federal government in
regulating indecent speech through its licensing of radio and televi-
sion from the beginning in the Federal Radio Act of 1927 to the
recent actions of the Federal Communications Commission. 20 Both
authors also describe the role the federal appeals court in the Dis-
trict of Columbia has played in providing a rocky constitutional
road for FCC policy.21 Professor Baker analyzes indecency policy
under First Amendment decisions providing for "strong protection"
for speech and finds support for a narrow channelling rule in the
concept of reasonable time, place and manner regulations of
speech.22 Professor Weinberg addresses the question of whether
the definition of indecency and practices of enforcement of the
Commission satisfy the precision and certainty requirements of the
First Amendment vagueness doctrine. 23 He concludes that FCC
17. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Butler v. Michigan, 352
U.S. 380 (1957).
18. See generally Wise, supra note 3.
19. In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464, 8 F.C.C.R. 704, 705 n.10 (1993).
For a discussion that compares the FCC's definition of indecency with the
Supreme Court's definition of obscenity, seeJonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and In-
decency, 3 Vn±L. SPORTS & Errr. L.J. 221 (1996).
20. See generally Wise, supra note 3; Jeremy H. Lipschultz, The Influence of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on Broadcast Indecency
Policy, 3 VIt.. SPORTS & Err. L.J. 65 (1996).
21. See generally Wise, supra note 3; Lipschultz, supra note 20.
22. C. Edwin Baker, The Evening Hours During Pacifica Standard Time, 3 Viii.
SPORTS & Err. L.J. 45 (1996).
23. See generally Weinberg, supra note 19, at 221-58.
19961
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policy does not satisfy the requirements of the vagueness doctrine
as it has developed in ordinary First Amendment cases. 24
The constitutional problem facing the Commission is that the
foundation of early Court precedent that gave broadcasters second
class status under the First Amendment is rapidly eroding. The re-
sult is an emerging view that broadcasters have full blown First
Amendment rights. Proponents of the view that the government
may prohibit the broadcasting of indecent speech short of obscen-
ity rely on Supreme Court precedent upholding FCC regulations of
broadcasting that were challenged on First Amendment grounds.
In 1969, the Court upheld FCC regulations that required broadcast-
ers to provide access for persons to reply to broadcasted attacks
against them.25
Right to reply requirements violate the First Amendment if en-
acted against the print media because they violate the core First
Amendment principle that editors, not the government, should de-
cide what to publish.2 6 In the "Right to Reply" FCC case, the Court
clearly grounded greater constitutional authority to regulate the
broadcast media on the basis of the limited radio frequencies that
were available for the transmission of radio and television signals.27
This scarcity rationale has been severely eroded by changes in
broadcasting technology.
FCC indecent speech policy was upheld against constitutional
challenges in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, decided in 1978.28 The
Court upheld a Commission ruling sanctioning a radio station for
airing George Carlin's filthy words dialogueYa However, the Court
was divided regarding the basis for expanded constitutional author-
ity for regulating "indecent" broadcast speech.30 The FCC sanc-
tions in Pacifica applied to a scatologically filled comedic dialogue
that was aired on the radio in the afternoon.31 Five members of the
Court found that the pervasive and uncontrollable nature of the
broadcast media justified limited restrictions on indecent speech in
order to protect children listeners and unwilling adults from inde-
24. Id. at 255-56.
25. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (viewers' and listen-
ers' right to have medium function consistently with ends and purposes of First
Amendment is paramount to right of broadcasters).
26. Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
27. Id.
28. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
29. Id. at 750.
30. Id. at 745, 759 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment), 762-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 778-79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 729.
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cent speech in their homes. Justice Stevens was joined by two mem-
bers of the Court in the view that the content of the speech, while
not obscene, was of lesser First Amendment value than fully pro-
tected speech.3 2 In addition, the Court emphasized that it was lim-
iting its ruling to the precise facts before it, specifically, application
of indecency policy to afternoon airing on radio of the Carlin dia-
logue. The nuisance rationale of the majority in Pacifica has re-
placed the scarcity rationale and is the central plank of the FCC's
argument in support of the regulation of indecent speech.3 3 As ob-
served by Justice Stevens: "When the Commission finds that a pig
has entered the parlor, the exercise of discretion does not depend
on proof that the pig is obscene."34
The significance of Pacifca as precedent for special authority
to regulate broadcast speech has been diminished by subsequent
Supreme Court decisions. A majority of the Court took the view
that a federal prohibition of indecent speech that is short of ob-
scenity, over the telephone violates the First Amendment. Further,
it clearly seems to hold that cable television is entitled to the same
First Amendment protection as the print media.3 5 If broadcasters
have full blown First Amendment rights then, under tests devel-
oped for other First Amendment actors, the FCC would have to
demonstrate that the particular indecency policy furthered compel-
ling governmental interests in a way that was the least detrimental
to protected speech.
Edythe Wise is Assistant Chief of the Enforcement Division of
the FCC.3 6 Her article reflects the current position of the FCC,
namely, that the agency's evolving policy of regulating indecent
speech on broadcasting is not unconstitutionally vague and not im-
permissible content regulation under the First Amendment.3 7 Ms.
Wise carefully traces the evolution of FCC indecency policy from
the 1920s to the 1990s. 38 During this period, court opinions "cre-
ated a foundation for the balancing of rights" that is reflected in
32. Id.
33. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
34. Id. at 750-51.
35. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 105, 127 (1989). The Sable
Court held that a total ban on indecent telephone communications did not pass
the strict scrutiny test because it was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 131. See also Tur-
ner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (holding that First
Amendment principles do not vary from medium to medium).
36. See Wise, supra note 3, at 15.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 19-43.
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current FCC policy.3 9 She describes what is balanced as: (1) the
privacy of the home, (2) parental rights to protect children from
objectionable material, and (3) the free speech rights of broadcast-
ers and their audiences. 40 Ms. Wise's article contains an interesting
account of the history of FCC indecency policy and of the political
and judicial influences on that policy. The bone of contention with
FCC policy in the D.C. Circuit has been over the adequacy of the
Commission's demonstration that the safe harbor policy is strictly
tailored to protect parental rights to shield their children from ob-
jectionable material. 41 In 1990, the Commission claimed that avail-
able data established that unsupervised children view television and
listen to the radio twenty-four hours a day.42 Therefore, the Com-
mission contended a twenty-four hour ban on indecent speech was
necessary to the preservation of the parental right to protect their
children from harmful material. 43 In finding the total ban uncon-
stitutional, the D.C. Circuit rejected this argument.
Ms. Wise observes that FCC indecency policy has been molded
by impetus from Congress and court decisions that developed tradi-
tional First Amendment doctrine as well as court decisions defining
the First Amendment status of broadcast licensees. 44 Currently, the
Commission defends its indecency policy on standard First Amend-
ment grounds; the channeling policy is necessary to protect impor-
tant constitutionally recognized interests. 45 As several of the
symposium authors note, however, indecency policy may be fatally
overbroad under the strict First Amendment requirements for fully
protected speech. Any blanket prohibition for speech defined as
indecent by the Commission, even for a limited period of viewing
time, denies adult viewers access to such speech and also deprives
some parents of the right to choose to supervise their children by
allowing them to view indecent material. Judge Buckley, writing for
the majority, in the most recent venture of the D. C. Circuit into the
troubled constitutional waters of FCC indecency policy found that
the Commission had demonstrated that a safe harbor policy from
midnight to six o'clock a.m. was the least restrictive means of fur-
thering the compelling governmental interests of supporting paren-
39. Id. at 33.
40. Id. at 43.
41. Wise, supra note 3, at 32 & 39.
42. Id. at 40-41.
43. For a discussion on FCC indecency policy in regards to safe harbor provi-
sions, see Wise, supra note 3, at 40-42.
44. See generally id. at 17-26.
45. See id. at 22-28.
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tal supervision of children and in promoting the well being of
minors. According to the majority, the Commission had satisfied
the requirements of this strict First Amendment test by showing
that a large segment of minors under eighteen did not watch televi-
sion after midnight while a large segment of adults did.46 Chief
Judge Edwards, writing in dissent, concluded that evidence of view-
ing habits of adults and minors was not even close to the kind of
demonstration that was applied in standard First Amendment cases
applying the least detrimental alternative means test. The Commis-
sion under strict First Amendment tests needed to show that there
were not ways to provide parents with control over broadcast inde-
cency other than a complete ban during the early and prime time
hours of television viewing.
As the current controversy in the D.C. Circuit suggests, and the
commentary in this symposium affirm, full First Amendment status
may require that the focus of FCC policy move away from air time
prohibitions to a policy that provides adults greater access to and
control over speech in the privacy of the home. The availability of
blocking technology that provides parents with control over what
their children are exposed to on television or radio during the un-
supervised time should be considered in formulating indecency
policy if broadcasters are considered first class First Amendment
players.
Professor Baker brings a fresh look to the discussion. He stakes
out the position that a carefully tailored safe harbor policy that
channels indecent speech to the morning and afternoon hours is
consistent with what is a "strong protection for speech."47 Professor
Baker takes the view that First Amendment principles do not vary
from media to media and that principles that provide strong pro-
tection for speech apply to regulation of the broadcast media. Pro-
fessor Baker does not find the rationales by the Commission and
others that are commonly attributed to Pacifica sufficient to support
the constitutionality of a safe harbor policy.4 He argues that
Pacifica is one of a series of Supreme Court cases that sanction the
channelling of speech by the government in circumstances where
the channelling does not constitute government suppression or
abridgment of speech. If the government's rule that channels
speech does not interfere with the public's access to the content of
expression there is no suppression of speech and strong protection
46. ACT IV, 58 F.3d 654, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
47. See Baker, supra note 22, at 52-60.
48. Id. at 54-55.
1996]
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of speech values are not implicated.4 9 Professor Baker relies on
Supreme Court cases which uphold laws that limit speech with a
certain content to a particular time and place.50 Historically, the
government may require that constitutionally protected expression
be limited to a particular time or place and be expressed in a partic-
ular manner without running afoul of the First Amendment. Zon-
ing laws that regulate the time, place and manner of speech have
been upheld if they do not restrict the overall availability of pro-
tected speech. Thus, Professor Baker concludes that in some cir-
cumstances a channelling policy is a form of time, place and
manner regulation that would be consistent with a strong sense of
speech rights as long as the policy did not restrict the overall availa-
bility of First Amendment protected speech to adults. 51 The FCC
policy that restricts indecency during the bulk of prime time would
be unconstitutional suppression of speech because the policy mate-
rially interferes with the availability of speech to adults; while an
indecency policy that stopped at the early evening hours would not.
Professor Weinberg's article examines whether FCC indecency
policy satisfies the traditional First Amendment requirement that
laws regulating the content of speech be sufficiently clear in mark-
ing the boundaries of the speech that is the subject of the regula-
tion to satisfy the vagueness doctrine.52 Vague laws that regulate
the content of speech violate the First Amendment because they
invite arbitrary enforcement and self censorship. 53 There was no
discussion of vagueness in Pacifica. The D.C. Circuit and the FCC
read the decision by the Court in Paifica as implicitly holding that
the indecency policy before it was not unconstitutionally vague.
Weinberg engages in the analysis that is not undertaken by the
Court in Pacifica and evaluates FCC indecency policy under vague-
ness rules that have developed in ordinary First Amendment
cases. 54 He concludes that the FCC definition of indecent material
fails stringent First Amendment vagueness requirements. 55 Wein-
berg contends that the meanings of "indecent" and "highly offen-
49. Id. at 58.
50. Id. at 58-60.
51. Baker, supra note 22, at 58. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427
U.S. 50, 78 n.2 (1976) (Powell,J., concurring) (citing three cases, Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 91 (1972); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (involving demonstrations where place was
relevant to effectiveness and content)).
52. See Weinberg, supra note 19 at 224.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 227.
55. Id. at 225.
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sive" in the FCC definition relies so much on "notions of good
taste" that if evaluated under ordinary First Amendment vagueness
standards, they would fail the requirements of predictability and
clarity that the Supreme Court has developed. 56 Weinberg points
to the arbitrary enforcement of indecency policy by the FCC as fur-
ther grounds for First Amendment vagueness concerns. Howard
Stem has been a focus of FCC indecency policy and daytime talk
shows have not. Weinberg suggests that the failure of the FCC to
take action against such shows demonstrates that enforcement of
FCC indecency policy is arbitrary. Anyone familiar with the content
of many popular daytime talk shows should find Weinberg"s posi-
tion compelling.57 Ultimately, Professor Weinberg concludes that
any vigorous enforcement of indecency standards would likely not
satisfy the stringent requirements of the First Amendment vague-
ness doctrine. 58
Professor Levi's article examines the interface of FCC inde-
cency policy and statutory prohibitions against censorship and re-
quirements to provide media access. 59 Professor Levi's article
focuses on a Commission ruling that found broadcasters had discre-
tion to channel political ads that contained graphic abortion
images to late hours if the decision to do so was viewpoint neutral
and based upon a good faith belief that such advertisements were
harmful to children. 60 The ruling also interpreted the indecency
policy to be limited to sexually offensive material and therefore not
applicable to the type of politically offensive speech that is found in
the graphic images contained in some political ads on the abortion
controversy.61 Professor Levi thoroughly examines the arguments
in support and against the Commission's positions.62
Professor Levi's article demonstrates the complexity of the in-
decency issue.63 The Commission was faced with facts that impli-
cated several federal regulations, First Amendment caselaw, and
administrative law.64 Indecency policy, laws requiring broadcasters
to provide reasonable access to political candidates, and laws
56. Id. at 227.
57. Weinberg, supra note 19, at 229-31.
58. Id. at 257.
59. Lili Levi, Anti-Abortion Political Advertising, Indecency and the FCC, 3 ViLL.
SPORTS & ENr. LJ. 85 (1996).
60. See id. at 99-106.
61. See id. at 106-20.
62. See id. at 181-218.
63. See id. at 181-218.
64. See generally Levi, supra note 62, at 85-220.
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prohibiting broadcaster censorship came together in the case. 65
Professor Levi carefully considers the implications of the Commis-
sion's choice to deal with the case as a matter of broadcaster discre-
tion and not indecency policy.66 She points out the benefits of this
strategy, especially in avoiding First Amendment problems, but ulti-
mately disagrees with the soundness of the decision both as a mat-
ter of legal doctrine and public policy. 67 The problems of the
potential for censorship of Commission sanctioned channelling
based upon broadcasters determination of harm to children weigh
heavily in Professor Levi's analysis.68 On balance, she concludes
that a serious commitment to free political speech over radio and
television requires a policy that mandates airing of shocking polit-
ical ads even in the face of concerns about children.69
Professor Hammond's article places FCC broadcast indecency
policy in the broader context of laws and proposed legislation that
regulated indecent and obscene speech that is communicated over
cable television, the telephone and computer networks.70 He de-
scribes the central features of current and proposed legislation
designed to regulate indecency in all of available media technology,
including the controversial Communication Decency Act of 1995
that is currently being considered by Congress. 71 This new regime
of regulating indecency over media technology other than broad-
casting features leaving the initial choice to carry indecent speech
to the discretion of the network operators. 72 If the operator opts to
allow programming of indecent speech it must be blocked until the
consumer requests that an indecent program be reversed. 73 FCC
regulations promulgated pursuant to the 1992 Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act imposes such a scheme
on cable television operators. On June 6, 1995, in Alliance for Com-
munity Media v. FCC,74 the D.C. Circuit sitting en banc upheld the
FCC blocking regulations, again, as in the FCC indecent broadcast-
ing decision, the court was divided. Seven judges voted with the
65. See id.
66. See id. at 189-204.
67. See id. at 210-17.
68. See id. at 184-86.
69. See Levi, supra note 62, at 218-20.
70. Allen S. Hammond, IV, Indecent Proposals: Reason, Restraint and Responsibil-
ity in the Regulation of Indenceny, 3 VIL. SPORTS & ENr. L.J. 259 (1996).
71. Id. at 259-61.
72. Id. at 271-2.
73. Id.
74. 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1995).
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majority and four dissented.75 The Majority found no state action
with respect to the regulations generally because the cable opera-
tors were private actors when they followed the regulations. 76
Although regulations requiring blocking for mandated leased chan-
nels for public access did constitute state action, the mandated
blocking rule was found to be the least restrictive means for further-
ing the government's interest in limiting access of children to inde-
cent programming. 77
A central feature of the two recent D.C. Circuit opinions up-
holding regulation of indecency is the holding that the safe harbor
and mandatory and reverse blocking rules are the least detrimental
means for the government to prevent harm to children from the
material that the Commission has defined as indecent. 7 The strict
First Amendment test that was found satisfied by the court generally
imposes a heavy burden on the government. Yet, as Professor Ham-
mond critically observes, the best view of these cases is that the gov-
ernment did not demonstrate, through credible evidence, that
indecent speech causes harm to children. 79 Harm was in fact pre-
sumed by the majority when it concluded that failure to establish
the absence of a causal connection coupled with parental concern
was sufficient.80
Deference to legislative judgments about harm is not a feature
of standard First Amendment case law and the effect of such defer-
ence in the indecency speech cases provides the appearance of
granting broadcasters and cable operators full First Amendment
speech status when the reality is quite different. Professor Baker is
also critical of the harm to children aspect to the D.C. Circuit inde-
cent broadcasting case.81 He finds it inconsistent with the strong
speech principle that proscribes the government from furthering
legitimate purposes by means that reduce adults to the level of chil-
dren.82 Yet, as Professor Hammond observes, the net effect of the
D.C. Circuit cases and Pacifica is that the government may substan-
tially limit access by adults to constitutionally protected speech pro-
viding it does not adopt a policy of totally banning indecent
75. Id. at 109.
76. Id. at 123.
77. Id. at 125.
78. See ACT IV, 58 F.3d 654, 660-61 (D.C. Cir. 1995); AUiance for Community
Media, 56 F.3d at 125.
79. See Hammond, supra note 73, at 279.
80. See ACTIV, 58 F.3d at 662; Alliance for Community Media, 56 F.3d at 127-28.
81. See Baker, supra note 22, at 61-62.
82. Id. at 63-64.
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speech.8 3 The Supreme Court has accepted review of the D.C. Cir-
cuit cable operator blocking regulations case.84 Stay tuned.
83. See Hammond, supra note 73, at 279.
84. See Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1995).
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